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ARTICLE
THE ARCTIC NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE,
CORRELATIVE RIGHTS, AND
SOURDOUGH: NOT JUST
FOR BREAD ANYMORE
ROBERT W. CORBISIER*
This Article highlights the legal questions presented by oil drilling
operations conducted in the Sourdough oil field, which is directly
adjacent to the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). The
author provides background information on the nature of oil deposits and the impact oil has on the State of Alaska in general,
discusses the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act as
it applies to oil drainage and oil field unitization, and articulates
the financial and legal interests of the federal government and the
State of Alaska implicated by a decision not to commence drilling
operations in ANWR. The Article concludes that there are four
possible courses of legal action that could potentially resolve the
issues presented by Sourdough drainage: (1) the federal government could sue the State of Alaska to prove drainage and claim
federal royalties; (2) the State of Alaska could sue the federal government, claiming the need to unitize the Sourdough field; (3) the
State of Alaska could seek a declaratory judgment to secure its
rights to the drained oil; or (4) the Secretary of the Interior could
lease land in ANWR to preserve the United States’ interest in the
undeveloped oil.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of March 13, 1997, BP Exploration, Alaska,
Inc. (BP), announced to the world the birth of the Sourdough oil
1
field (Sourdough). BP estimated the field contained approxi2
mately 100 million barrels of oil, a discovery Alaska Governor
3
Tony Knowles hailed as “significant.” Some geologists believed
the Sourdough field could contain as many as 300 million barrels of
4
oil.
Sourdough is unique among the oil fields in Alaska’s North
Slope region because it lies adjacent to the Arctic National Wildlife
5
Refuge (ANWR). ANWR is owned by the federal government
6
and is currently closed to oil and gas exploration. BP has stated
that the Sourdough field, located on land owned by the State of
7
Alaska, extends to the ANWR border. Environmentalists have
stated that the exploration site is less than one kilometer from
8
ANWR. Normally, an oil field occurring near a border does not
create any issues, but this single oil reservoir may extend across the
9
border into the neighboring closed federal lands. Therefore, oil

1. Press Release, Gov. Tony Knowles, Knowles Welcomes BP Sourdough
Announcement (Mar. 13, 1997), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/press/pr
031397.html [hereinafter Knowles Press Release].
2. NORMAN J. HYNE, PH.D, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM
GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION, DRILLING AND PRODUCTION 16 (1995) (“The English
unit of crude oil measurement is a barrel (bbl) that holds 42 U.S. gallons or 34.97
Imperial gallons.”).
3. Knowles Press Release, supra note 1.
4. Toni Mack, Damned if He Does, Damned if He Doesn’t, FORBES, July 7,
1997, at 82, available at http://www.anwr.org/features/forbes.htm.
5. The North Slope of Alaska, known for its large reserves of oil, refers to
the region of the state that dips north from the Brooks Range. Backbone—
Standing Up for Alaska’s Future, Information About the Merger, at
http://www.alaskabackbone.com/BPRework/02Background2.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2002); see also CLAUS M. NASKE & HERMAN E. SLOTNICK, ALASKA, A
HISTORY OF THE 49TH STATE 8-9 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1987) (1979) (describing
the slope region and its proximity to ANWR).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (2000).
7. Gerald Karey & Rose Ragsdale, If US Wants Fees from Sourdough, Drilling at ANWR is Possible, PLATT’S OILGRAM NEWS, Mar. 17, 1997, LEXIS, News
Folder, Ponews File.
8. Alaska Find Sparking Environmental Worry, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 14,
1997, at D10.
9. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON NAT. RESOURCES, 105TH CONG., ARCTIC
NAT’L WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANWR), http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/ resources/105cong/energy/anwr.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002) [hereinafter HOUSE
COMM.].
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could potentially flow from beneath ANWR to the state land. Although the owner of land overlying an oil field may lease the right
to drill for the oil, the owner typically retains a royalty interest in
the oil produced.10 If the Sourdough field does in fact extend into
ANWR, oil produced on the state side could pull oil from the federal land—meaning that royalties otherwise belonging to the federal government may go to the State of Alaska.
The Sourdough field thus presents an interesting problem:
How can the federal government determine if wells located on
state leases drain oil from the adjacent federal land, which is closed
11
to drilling? More importantly, once the government makes such a
determination, what legal steps can both the State of Alaska and
the federal government take to protect their respective rights in the
oil itself, or the royalties derived therefrom? Should Sourdough be
developed for the underlying purpose of opening ANWR? At
least one Alaskan authority believes that the federal government
must drill a well to determine how much oil can be produced from
12
the federal side. Drilling a well would require an act of Congress
because a provision in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) closed the coastal plain of ANWR to fur13
ther oil exploration and development. However, notwithstanding
the statutory prohibition, former U.S. Secretary of Interior Bruce
Babbitt has stated that the Interior Department has the responsibility of ensuring that federal taxpayers are compensated for any
federally owned oil that drains to state lands, regardless of the sur14
face development of ANWR.
It remains uncertain whether the Sourdough oil accumulation
extends into ANWR, but if it does, production from the state land

10. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL &
GAS TERMS 209 (1991) (defining a “lease”) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MEYERS
MANUAL].
11. HOUSE COMM., supra note 9 (“How does the federal government determine if the wells produced on State leases drain oil or gas from the adjacent federal land?”).
12. Mack, supra note 4, at 82 (“To determine recoverable oil, you need information about the rock itself, and that’s only available if you drill wells.” (quoting
David Johnston, former Oil and Gas Conservation Commissioner for the State of
Alaska)).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (2000).
14. 100-Million-Bbl Oil Field Discovered Near Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
ALASKA REPORT (Petroleum Information/Dwights LLC, Denver, Colo.), Mar. 19,
1997, at 1, 3 [hereinafter 100-Million-Bbl Oil Field]; Mack, supra note 4, at 82; see
infra Part II.D (explaining the repercussions of drainage from federal lands).
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is likely to draw oil from the federal side.15 In November 2001, the
State of Alaska reached an agreement16 with the lease owners of
the Point Thomson Unit (Unit), the oil development area that in17
The agreement requires the companies to
cludes Sourdough.
achieve sustained commercial production from certain areas of the
18
Unit by June 15, 2008, and for Sourdough specifically by June 15,
19
2010. If Congress does not allow leasing in ANWR for oil and gas
production prior to June 15, 2010, thereby allowing the federal
government to drill wells of its own, Sourdough is likely to become
a factor in the debate that rages over whether ANWR should be
opened for oil and gas exploration. If the State develops Sourdough, the issue of oil drainage from federal to state land provides
another reason why ANWR should be opened to exploration—to
prevent further loss of federal oil and ensuing royalties.
Part II of this Article provides a background into the physical
nature of oil, how the ownership of the lands above and adjacent to
Sourdough developed, and the impact that oil has on the State of
Alaska. The physical properties of oil and the political boundaries
near Sourdough are important to understanding the application of
modern property law doctrines and why Alaska has a strong interest in seeing Sourdough developed. Part III begins by discussing

15. Helen Jung, Test Data Stirs Hopes for Oil Field; Deposit May Reach Underneath ANWR, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 14, 1997, at 1A, LEXIS, News
Folder, Anchdn File (stating that petroleum engineer Jack Hartz claims drainage
could occur).
16. Yereth Rosen, Alaska Approves Expansion of Pt Thomson Gas Prospect,
REUTERS, Nov. 13, 2001, at http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/011113/n13192490_1.html (last
visited Nov. 24, 2001); see also Letter and Attachment from Mark D. Myers, Dir.,
Alaska Dep’t of Nat. Resources Div. of Oil and Gas, to Bill Strawbridge, Reservoir Evaluation Manager, ExxonMobil Prod. Co. (Aug. 29, 2001), at
http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/programs/units/pt_expand_approval_082901.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2002) (outlining terms of proposed agreement).
17. The majority owners of the Point Thomson Unit leases are ExxonMobil,
BP, and Chevron. Kristen Nelson, State Asks for Production from Point Thomson
Unit Next to ANWR by 2008, PETROLEUM NEWS ALASKA, May 2001, at 1, available at http://www.petroleumnewsalaska.com/pnarch/010544.htm (last visited Dec.
26, 2001). For more information on unitization, see infra Part III.C.
18. Kristen Nelson, Exxon’s Plan for Point Thomson Brings Field Closer to
Development, PETROLEUM NEWS ALASKA, April 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.petroleumnewsalaska.com/pnarch/010402.htm (last visited Nov. 24,
2001); State Conditionally Approves Point Thomson Unit Contract ExpansionContraction, PETROLEUM NEWS ALASKA, Aug. 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.petroleumnewsalaska.com/nbarch/07921.html (last visited Nov. 24,
2001); see also Rosen, supra note 16; Nelson, supra note 17, at 1.
19. Nelson, supra note 18, at 1.
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the application of the “rule of capture,” the intent of ANILCA as it
applies to oil drainage, and oil field unitization. Part III also discusses the implied executive authority to allow leasing when there
is oil drainage from federal land, what is needed to show the existence of oil, and the proof required to show drainage. Part IV explains why ANWR will actually contribute to a reduction of the
United States’ dependency on foreign oil and how ANWR can be
developed with environmental sensitivity. Part V concludes by
outlining four possible legal remedies for Sourdough drainage: (1)
the federal government could sue the State of Alaska to prove
drainage and claim federal royalties; (2) the State of Alaska could
sue the federal government, claiming the need to unitize the Sourdough field; (3) the State of Alaska could seek a declaratory judgment to secure its rights to the drained oil; or (4) the Secretary of
the Interior could lease land in ANWR to preserve the United
States’ interest in the undeveloped oil.
II. OIL DYNAMICS, ALASKA’S LAND HISTORY,
AND THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF OIL
To understand the legal implications underlying Sourdough’s
development, it is essential to have a basic understanding of the
dynamics of oil development and production, the history of the
ANWR and the other lands surrounding the Sourdough oil field,
and the historical impact of oil development on the State of
Alaska.
A. Oil Development and Production
The State of Alaska and the federal government both have an
interest in Sourdough: they are the owners of the overlying land.
“Correlative rights” is a common law property doctrine that concerns multiple parties’ interests in a common source, such as sub20
surface mineral rights. Typically, the correlative rights doctrine

20. EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 4.3, at 119
(1st ed. 1987). Kuntz notes that correlative rights is defined by Nev. Rev. Stat. §
522.020(1) as follows:
[T]he opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the
owner of each property in a pool to produce without waste his just and
equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool; being an amount, so
far as can be practically determined, and so far as can practically be obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of
recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for such purposes to use his
just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.
The application of the correlative rights doctrine has been explained as follows:
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refers to those rights and duties that exist when landowners have
an interest in a common source, which in the context of Sourdough
is an oil field.21 The doctrine of correlative rights includes (1) the
right against waste of an extracted substance; (2) the right against
spoiling the common source; (3) the right against malicious depletion of the source; (4) the right to a fair opportunity to extract the
source; and (5) the right to conduct operations to enhance recovery
22
from the source. Courts have characterized oil and gas in their
23
natural state as fugitive, a term similarly used to describe wildlife
24
and water. This analogy has led courts to erroneous conclusions;
oil and gas, at least under natural conditions underground, are essentially static, moving on a geologic scale of time imperceptible to
25
humans.
It is generally accepted that oil develops from the decomposition of animals, mostly marine, that die in concentrated areas, the
26
remains of which are chemically altered over time. Oil and gas
deposits are found in sedimentary beds of sandstone, shale, and
27
limestone and are “capped” by a more impervious rock strata.
The oil and gas molecules are not pooled in large cavernous enclosures as many people believe; instead, they occupy the interstitial
28
spaces of the rock, which are the microscopic pores within the

There appear to be two aspects of the doctrine of correlative rights: (1)
as a corollary of the rule of capture, each person has a right to produce
oil from his land and capture such oil or gas as may be produced from his
well, and (2) a right of the land owner to be protected against damage to
a common source of supply and a right to a fair and equitable share of
the source of supply.
When a legislature or administrative body regulates production practices
to protect against waste, it may also regulate to insure equitable distribution of the source of supply. There is some dispute over the power of the
state to regulate production practices to insure equitable distribution of
the source of supply, apart from waste.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL, supra note 10, at 257 (citations omitted).
21. KUNTZ, supra note 20, § 4.3, at 119.
22. Id. at 120 (“[Correlative rights] is a simple doctrine that owners of rights in
a common source of supply may not inflict loss upon one another by conduct
which is considered to be socially undesirable.”).
23. See, e.g., Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210,
233 (1932) (describing oil and gas as “fugacious”); see also Wm. E. Colby, The
Law of Oil and Gas, 31 CAL. L. REV. 357, 357 (1943) (explaining the synonyms
that courts have used to describe oil and gas in their natural state).
24. Colby, supra note 23, at 357.
25. Id. at 360.
26. Id. at 357.
27. Id. at 358 (listing sediments where oil and gas accumulate).
28. Id.
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rock itself.29 Oil and gas reservoirs form when hydrocarbons migrate up from their origin rock until they collect in a porous sedimentary deposit (the actual reservoir rock) overlain by a denser
mineral, such as shale or salt, which prevents the oil or gas from
migrating further.30 A reservoir is a porous rock that contains
commercial, economically recoverable quantities of oil or gas that
31
cannot escape because of surrounding layers of impervious rock.
In many oil fields, water and gas tend to collect in the reservoir
as well. Water, which is denser than oil, tends to migrate to the
lower portions of the reservoir while still exerting an upward pres32
sure on the oil. Gas, which has either escaped from the oil or migrated from an origin rock, tends to collect at the top of the formation as a “gas cap” and exerts its own downward pressure on the
33
oil. All of the pressures on the oil sum up to a total pressure
called “reservoir energy,” which is used to aid in the extraction
34
process.
When a well is drilled into the reservoir, these reservoir pressures are released, causing the fluids to migrate underground toward the bottom of the well, where they are brought to the sur35
face. However, oil and gas are left behind when the pressure falls
to a point where the total reservoir pressure can no longer force
36
the oil and gas to the surface. In such circumstances, engineers
have developed methods to assist in the production of the hydro37
carbons. One of these methods involves injecting water into the
reservoir to help maintain reservoir pressure and to push the oil
38
toward producing wells. In addition to injecting water into the
29. Videotape: Arctic Oil . . . Energy for Today and Tomorrow (Video Communications 1995) (on file with author); see also RENE COSSÉ, BASICS OF
RESERVOIR ENGINEERING 33-34 (1993).
30. San Joaquin Geological Society, Looking for Oil and Gas?, at http://
www.sjgs.com/exploration.html (last updated Sept. 23, 2002); HYNE, supra note 2,
at 1-2.
31. WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL, supra note 10, at 1057.
32. Colby, supra note 23, at 359.
33. Id. (explaining that while some of the gas under pressure is contained in
the oil, it usually migrates to the top of the reservoir).
34. Id. at 358.
35. HYNE, supra note 2, at 8.
36. Id. at 8-9.
37. Id. at 9.
38. See KUNTZ, supra note 20, § 4.8, at 130; see also COSSÉ, supra note 29, at
211. Cossé notes that:
[i]n earlier days, it sufficed in a preliminary period (and this still sometimes happens today [in a newly discovered oil or gas field]) to open the
wells and to allow the reservoirs to decompress: hence the term primary
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formation, gas that is either produced with the oil or imported from
another field can also be injected into the reservoir gas cap to assist
in maintaining pressure.39
Within the larger issue of correlative rights, the production of
oil and gas as they flow from their natural state to one of actual
possession has an area of property law all to itself. However, oil
and gas law and correlative rights law still sit within the larger context of property law, both real property and possessions. Therefore, the ownership history of the lands overlying and surrounding
Sourdough is helpful in understanding how these ownerships affect
Sourdough’s development.
B. History of Alaska’s Lands
The Territory of Alaska was organized in 1912 and efforts for
40
its admission as a state began as soon as 1916. There were many

recovery or natural depletion. When the reservoir pressure and hence
well flow rates become too low, an attempt was sometimes made to attenuate or offset this decompression of the reservoir by the injection of
water or gas, called secondary recovery.
Id. (emphasis in original). Cossé goes on to state:
[r]ecovery by natural drive mechanisms rarely exceeds 30 to 40%, and is
often lower for oil reservoirs. This is why the need soon appeared to
inject energy into these reservoirs to achieve better recovery. The first
processes employed (injection of water or gas) were employed in a second phase, after decompression of the reservoir, hence the name secondary recovery.
Id. at 261 (emphasis in original).
39. COSSÉ, supra note 29, at 211. It is also possible to push oil out from underneath adjacent land using these techniques; however, some jurisdictions have
taken the view that this is a compensable tort. See, e.g., Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521
F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding forcible displacement of valuable subsurface
minerals as an actionable trespass); Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner
City Unit, 444 F.2d 439, 445 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding plaintiff entitled to compensation because adjacent leaseholder’s water injection flooded plaintiff’s oil wells).
It has been theorized that Alaska could prevent oil drainage from ANWR using
water flood techniques, whereby water would be injected into the Sourdough field
along the ANWR border. This would push oil that originated on state land toward producing wells also located on state land. However, water would simultaneously flood into ANWR. See Kristen Nelson, Rule of Capture Prevails,
PETROLEUM NEWS ALASKA, Oct. 22, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.anwr.
org/features/capture.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2002). The flooding of water into
ANWR as a subsurface trespass, nuisance, or some other tort, is beyond the scope
of this Article.
40. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 687 (1996) (narrating a brief history of Alaska and describing concerns over Alaska’s entry into the Union);
NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 5, at 140-41.
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obstacles on the road to statehood, not the least of which concerned Alaska’s ability to be financially independent.41 The federal
government owned virtually all of Alaska’s 365 million acres im42
mediately prior to statehood. Because these federal lands could
not be taxed by Alaska after being granted statehood, Congress
and many Alaskans feared that Alaska would be unable to carry
out the responsibilities of statehood—despite the fact that Alaska
was the only government among the 48 states, Hawaii, and Puerto
43
Rico without any debt at the end of 1957. The proposed land
grants in the Statehood Act were considered the primary vehicle
for freeing Alaska from any future dependence on federal assis44
tance.
After considerable congressional debate concerning the
amount of land to allocate to the State, the final proposal limited
the State to selecting from land that had not previously been with45
drawn by the federal government for other specific purposes, such
46
as national parks and national forests. This represented a significant limitation because the federal government had already withdrawn 95 million of the Territory’s 365 million acres for these pur47
poses by 1954. Senator John Marshall Butler of Maryland stated
that the federal withdrawals “comprise[] almost all of the best and

41. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 688; NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 5, at 146-49
(describing the arguments in the debate over Alaska statehood).
42. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 688; NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 5, at 158 (stating that the federal government owned 99.8% of Alaska’s land mass upon its entry
into the Union).
43. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 688 (citing 104 CONG. REC. 12,322 (1958) (reprint of
Interior Department report)).
44. Id. at 690.
45. The term “withdrawal” has been defined as follows:
The designation by the executive branch of the federal government of
lands not available for settlement, location, sale or entry. Major withdrawals have been made for reclamation projects, power sites, stock
driveways, grazing districts and leases, national forests, wildlife refuges,
military and naval purposes . . . .
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981), 539
F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mont. 1982), held that the term “withdrawal,” as used
in the FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 . . . includes withdrawal of public lands from mineral exploration and leasing.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL, supra note 10, at 1372 (citations omitted).
46. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 691 (stating that each proposal for statehood contained a limitation preventing selection of lands withdrawn from public use by the
federal government); NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 5, at 155-57.
47. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 691.
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most valuable resources known to exist in the Territory.”48 Of the
95 million acres withdrawn, the largest reservation occurred in 1943
when the Department of the Interior withdrew 67 million acres in
three separate areas, including all of the oil-rich North Slope of
Alaska, to support the increased need for oil created by World War
II.49 This withdrawal included the area where Sourdough is located
and set the stage for Alaska’s discovery of oil on the North Slope.
C. History of Oil Development in Alaska
Geologists began exploring the petroleum potential of the
50
North Slope around 1906. The presence of natural oil seeps and
oil-stained rock throughout the North Slope region indicated the
51
The United
possibility of discovering subsurface oil reserves.
States Navy drilled on the North Slope between 1944 and 1953, but
52
found only uneconomic reserves of hydrocarbons. The Secretary
of the Interior ultimately released some of this land for mineral
leasing, but retained approximately one-third of the land as the
53
Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4. In Public Land Order 1621, the
Secretary formed the Arctic National Wildlife Range (the precursor to the modern day ANWR) on nine million acres, specifying
54
that the Range must remain open to mineral leasing. The Secretary’s order additionally provided that the land between the Naval
Petroleum Reserve No. 4 and the proposed wildlife range be made
55
available for leases under the Mineral Leasing Act.
48. Id. at 691-92 (citing S. REP. NO. 1929, at 34-35 (1950) (statement of Sen.
Butler)).
49. Id. at 691 (describing withdrawals made by the Secretary of the Interior).
50. TERRY R. TWYMAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ARCTIC PETROLEUM
DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY CRS-5 (June 19,
2001) (“Interest in the petroleum potential of the North Slope’s coastal plain,
65,000 square miles, or 11% of the land area of the state of Alaska, has been the
subject of interest and geologic exploration since about 1906.”).
51. Id.
52. Id. at CRS-5, CRS-6 (explaining how 37 test wells drilled by the Navy between 1944 and 1953 discovered several uneconomic hydrocarbon accumulations);
see also PETROLEUM NEWS ALASKA, KATALLA TO PRUDHOE BAY: AN
ENTERTAINING LOOK AT THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY IN ALASKA 15-16 (Kay Cashman ed., 1997) [hereinafter KATALLA].
53. 42 U.S.C. § 6502 (2000). This area is now known as the National Petroleum Reserve, Alaska (NPRA).
54. Public Land Order 1621, 23 Fed. Reg. 2637 (Apr. 22, 1958) [hereinafter
PLO 1621]. For further explanation of the Secretary’s order, see Alaska v. United
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 691 (1996), aff’d, 119 F.3d 16 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
55. PLO 1621, 23 Fed. Reg. 2637; see Rowe v. United States, 464 F. Supp.
1060, 1064 n.15 (D. Alaska 1979) (“The lands opened to leasing by PLO 1621
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The United States admitted Alaska as the forty-ninth state on
January 3, 1959.56 The Alaska Department of Natural Resources,
the agency charged with carrying out statehood land selections,
hired petroleum geologist Tom Marshall as an assistant land selec57
tor that same year. In 1961, Marshall recommended that the State
select a 1.5 million acre tract of land on the North Slope, which had
been part of the federal land release included in Public Land Order
58
1621. Oil companies had not been interested in that particular
stretch of the Arctic coast when it was under federal control, but its
geologic features reminded Marshall of large oil fields in the Rocky
59
Mountains. Many Alaskans criticized Marshall for choosing “a
useless frozen wasteland” and dubbed his selection “Marshall’s
Icebox” because of the industry’s previous lack of interest in the
60
area.
In the summer of 1963, two geologists from Richfield Oil
Company who were scouting state lands on the North Slope wrote
an enthusiastic memo to their supervisor describing the potential
61
for discovery of oil in commercial quantities. BP geophysicists
began preliminary seismic work on the North Slope in the same
62
63
year. In 1964, the State auctioned the first Prudhoe Bay leases.

were all those lands (except Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 and the pending Arctic Wildlife Range) lying north of the crest of the Brooks Range and the DeLong
Mountains, from the United States-Canada border to Cape Lisburne and the Arctic Ocean.”).
56. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (codified as
amended at 48 U.S.C. § 21 (1994)).
57. Press Release, Univ. of Alaska Fairbanks, Seminar with Geologist Tom
Marshall (Oct. 23, 2000), available at http://www.uaf.edu/univrel/media/
FY01/030ma.html (last modified Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter UAF Press Release];
KATALLA, supra note 52, at 42-43.
58. UAF Press Release, supra note 57; KATALLA, supra note 52, at 42-43.
59. Ned Rozell, Scientist’s Decision Helps Alaska Wallets, 2000 UNIV. OF
ALASKA GEOPHYSICAL INST., ALASKA SCI. F. 1561, available at http://www.gi.
alaska.edu/ ScienceForum/ASF15/1516.html; KATALLA, supra note 52, at 42-43.
60. UAF Press Release, supra note 57; KATALLA, supra note 52, at 42-43.
61. JACK RODERICK, CRUDE DREAMS 138 (1997) (“We have a good selection
of excellent reservoir possibilities, and positive proof of the petroliferous nature of
these sands. If one cannot get an oil field out of these conditions, I give up.”).
62. BP P.L.C., North to Alaska (1999), at http://www.bp.com/alaska/
history/NorthToAlaska.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2001) (commenting that BP
geophysicists had little experience in seismic reflection surveys in permafrost
when they started exploration in 1963) [hereinafter North to Alaska].
63. BP P.L.C., The Trail to Prudhoe Bay (1999), at http://www.bp.com/
alaska/history/PrudhoeBay.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Prudhoe
Bay]. For further information on mineral leasing on federal lands, see GEORGE
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In March of 1968, ARCO64 announced an oil strike at Prudhoe Bay
State No. 1, which represented the discovery of the largest oil field
in North America.65
The State held another lease sale the following year, convening the auction in public and opening the sealed bids before an
66
audience. The State received $900 million from its second round
67
of Prudhoe Bay area leasing, which was the largest windfall in
68
That sale also marked the point at which
Alaska’s history.
Alaska’s state budget would become increasingly dependent on oil
revenue.
D. Oil’s Impact on Alaska
The Alaska Department of Revenue estimates that oil revenue will account for close to 80% of the 2002-2003 fiscal year unrestricted general-purpose revenue, an estimate that is based in part
69
on volatile futures market oil prices. In an affidavit submitted to
the Court of Federal Claims, the Director of the State of Alaska’s
Division of Oil and Gas stated that “[t]he long term stability of
Alaska’s economy is dependent upon the systematic exploitation of
70
Alaska’s oil and gas resources.” The need for new oil development is evidenced by the fact that overall production from the
71
North Slope oil fields has declined since 1988. Furthermore, while
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline has the capacity to transport more than
two million barrels of oil per day, the Alaska Department of Reve-

CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 570-99
(4th ed. 2001).
64. The Atlantic Refining Company merged with the Richfield Oil Corporation in 1966 to form ARCO. BP P.L.C., Acquisitions and Mergers Drive Growth
(1866-1969) (2001), at http://www.bp.com/company_overview/history/arco/
a_mergers.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
65. Prudhoe Bay, supra note 63; see also KATALLA, supra note 52, at 40-41.
66. Prudhoe Bay, supra note 63; RODERICK supra note 61, at 275-81.
67. RODERICK, supra note 61, at 275-81.
68. ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES DIV. OF OIL AND GAS, SUMMARY OF
STATE COMPETITIVE LEASE SALES, available at http://www.dog.dnr.
state.ak.us/oil/products/publications/otherreports/5year99/5year99_summary.html
(last revised Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COMPETITIVE LEASE SALES].
69. ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIVISION, FALL 2001 REVENUE
SOURCES BOOK EXEC. SUMMARY 25-27 (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://
www.tax.state.ak.us/SourcesBook/2001FallSources/III.%20Executive%20Summar
y.pdf.
70. Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 697 (1996).
71. Id. at 696.
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nue estimates that North Slope crude oil production will be barely
half that in the immediate future.72
The majority of Alaska’s oil revenue comes from state-owned
73
lands, particularly from those located on the North Slope. However, it is estimated that 74% of the recoverable reserves at the
“super-giant” Prudhoe Bay field, the largest of the North Slope oil
74
fields, has already been produced. Hence, Alaska has an eco75
nomic incentive to continue to explore and develop the surrounding smaller oil and gas deposits in order to offset the current
76
overall decline in North Slope production. Sourdough’s proposed
development will contribute to Alaska’s growing thirst for oilderived income.
E. History of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
If Sourdough drains oil and gas from federal land, it will drain
them from the coastal plain of ANWR, which is the most promising
77
unexplored oil and gas region in the United States. A 1998 assessment by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) indicates
a 95% probability of recovering 4.3 billion barrels of oil from the
coastal plain study area and a 5% probability of recovering 11.8
78
billion barrels. These figures do not include the state and Nativeowned lands in the area, which would boost these estimates to 5.7
79
billion and 16.0 billion barrels, respectively.

72. ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 69, at 28 (“Future development[s] . . . are projected to keep production slightly above the 1.0 million barrel
per day level through FY 2010.”).
73. Alaska, 35 Fed. Cl. at 696.
74. Id.
75. The existence of an economic incentive begs the question of what implications the development of Sourdough may have on other issues, such as national
energy policy. For further information on energy policy, see ANNE GILLIS ET AL.,
CRS INFOPACK, ENERGY POLICY IP447E (2001). See also John Benditt, Special
Issue, Energy, Can New Technology Reduce Our Need for Oil from the Middle
East?, TECH. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2002 (discussing emerging energy technologies).
76. For more discussion of oil’s impact on Alaska, see Bill McAllister, Oil and
Gas: Alaska’s Industry, JUNEAU EMPIRE ONLINE, Sept. 22, 2002, at
http://juneauempire.com/anwr/oilandgas.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
77. M. LYNNE CORN & BERNARD A. GELB, CRS ISSUE BRIEF, THE ARCTIC
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE: THE NEXT CHAPTER, at CRS-1 (Oct. 1, 2001).
78. UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGE, 1002 AREA, PETROLEUM ASSESSMENT, 1998, INCLUDING ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (April 2001), available at http://geology.cr.usgs.gov/pub/fact-sheets/fs0028-01/fs-0028-01.pdf.
79. Id.
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ANWR’s history is almost as tumultuous as the history of the
rest of the state. In 1957, the United States Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife applied to the Interior Department for permission to withdraw 8.9 million acres of
land to establish an arctic wildlife refuge.80 Alaska became a state
81
during the application approval process. On December 6, 1960,
the Secretary issued an order placing the Arctic National Wildlife
Range under the jurisdiction of the United States Fish and Wildlife
82
Service.
In 1980, Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands
83
Conservation Act, which expanded the Arctic National Wildlife
Range to include an additional 9.2 million acres, renamed it the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and designated much of the origi84
nal range as “wilderness.” Despite this designation, Congress in85
cluded one very specific directive in ANILCA section 1002. Congress required the Secretary of the Interior to inventory the fish
and wildlife resources of the coastal plain and to explore and iden86
tify those areas with oil and gas potential. Congress then closed
the coastal plain 1002 study area to further exploration or development until passage of a congressional act specifically authorizing
87
leasing.
III. SOURDOUGH’S DEVELOPMENT WARRANTS
OPENING ANWR TO OIL PRODUCTION
Section 1003 of ANILCA states that “[p]roduction of oil and
gas from ANWR is prohibited and no leasing or other development leading to production of oil and gas from the range shall be
88
undertaken until authorized by an Act of Congress.” This statement leaves many questions unanswered. For instance, does the
Act’s ban on oil production apply to oil drainage from ANWR to
adjacent state-owned land? Does section 1003 of the Act trump
Alaska’s sovereign right to develop its land when there is drainage?
80. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 46 (1997) (explaining the history of
ANWR in the context of a dispute over title to submerged lands).
81. Id.
82. Id.; 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598 (Dec. 6, 1960).
83. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), Pub. L. No.
96-487, § 303, 94 Stat. 2390 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (2000)).
84. See id. A designation of “wilderness” prohibits all road construction, use
of motor vehicles, and installation of structures. Id. § 1133(c).
85. Id. § 3142.
86. Id. § 3142(c).
87. Id. §§ 3142(h), 3143.
88. Id. § 3143.
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Does Alaska have any remedy that would allow legal production
from ANWR? Does the federal government have any method that
would allow it to prove drainage and claim royalties from stateproduced oil or gas? A brief examination of common law property
doctrine is relevant to answering these questions.
A. The “Rule of Capture” Still Applies
Under the common law of property, land ownership in fee
simple89 carries with it the rights to the minerals located therein.90
However, the common law takes a different approach to subsurface fluid minerals such as oil and gas. Earlier courts, which did
not fully appreciate the complexities of hydrocarbon reservoir geology, characterized these minerals as “fugitive” because of their
91
92
migratory nature. For example, in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, the
Court characterized oil and gas as similar to other minerals beneath the earth’s surface “except . . . [t]hey have no fixed situs under a particular portion of the earth’s surface within the area where
they obtain. They have the power, as it were, of self-transmission
93
[upon discovery].” Just as the owner of a surface interest cannot
claim rights to and follow a hunted animal when it leaves his property, neither may he follow oil or gas when it shifts from beneath
94
his property to that of another. A landowner, although entitled to
bore wells for natural gas and oil, has no title to those substances

89. Fee is “[a]n inheritable interest in land constituting maximum legal ownership . . .” and fee simple is “an interest in land . . . that endures until the current
holder dies without heirs.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 629-30 (7th ed. 1999).
90. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 202 (1900) (“No time need be spent
in restating the general common-law rule that the ownership in fee of the surface
of the earth carries with it the right to the minerals beneath, and the consequent
privilege of mining to extract them.”).
91. Lynch v. State Bd. of Equalization, 210 Cal. Rptr. 335, 338 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); see also Colby, supra note 23, at 357.
92. 177 U.S. 190 (1900) (holding that the legislature’s regulation to prevent
waste of natural gas was not a taking).
93. Id. at 202-03.
94. Id. at 209.
[T]he owner of land has the exclusive right on his property to reduce the
game there found to possession, just as the owner of the soil has the exclusive right to reduce to possession the deposits of natural gas and oil
found beneath the surface of his land. The owner of the soil cannot follow game when it passes from his property; so, also, the owner may not
follow the natural gas when it shifts from beneath his own to the property of someone else within the gas field.
Id.
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until he reduces them to actual possession.95 Pursuit alone does not
give the pursuer an interest in the pursued; the pursuer must take
actual possession.96
Under this “rule of capture,” a landowner may claim the fugitive resources originally located under the land of his neighbor
through operations on his own property, but does not own the sub97
stance until it has been reduced to actual possession and control.
The owner of the drained land has no legal remedy, but may protect his rights by drilling a well of his own in order to capture the
98
same resource. Although a lack of knowledge of oil field geology
led to its adoption, the common law rule of capture has not been
modified despite the subsequent advancement of scientific knowl99
edge.
Scientific advancement also enabled the drilling of wells where
their underground locations deviate from their surface locations.
Courts are in agreement that the use of any remote drilling is subsurface trespass when the well penetrates the land owned by an100
other. This holding would extend to the more modern technolo-

95. Id.
96. See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding
that a fox hunter has no action against a person who interferes with and kills the
fox being pursued by the hunter since the hunter did not have actual possession).
97. KUNTZ, supra note 20, § 4.1, at 112. Kuntz notes that
[a]ccording to the law of capture, in general terms, the landowner may
capture oil or gas by operations on his land. He owns the substance absolutely once it has been reduced to dominion and control. Before the
instant of control, however, the ownership of the substance or the right
to capture and control it is subject to the possibility of capture and control by another acting within his own rights as a landowner and producing from a common source of supply.
Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id.; see also Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897) (holding
that an oil company had lawful right to drain adjacent tract); Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907) (holding that a person may place oil and
gas wells anywhere on his property without violating his neighbor’s property rights
to whatever oil or gas may be under his own land).
99. KUNTZ, supra note 20, § 4.1, at 111-13.
100. Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167, 176 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1938) (“[N]o one has a right, by reason of the ownership of a surface location lying above an oil zone, to extend his oil wells without the boundaries of his own surface location, vertically, extended downward so as to trespass
upon the premises of adjoining owners . . . .”); see also Terre Aux Boeufs Land
Co., Inc. v. J. R. Gray Barge Co., 803 So. 2d 86, 95-96 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471, 494 (La. 1943)); Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar
Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841, 844 (N.D. 1997); Colby, supra note 23, at 401 (stating
that courts have unanimously held that a subsurface penetration is a trespass).
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gies of directional drilling, extended reach wells, horizontal drilling,
and designer wells when they cross into another person’s land.101
Subject to zoning regulations such as well-spacing and boundary
setbacks, an oil operator may freely and lawfully drain oil from his
neighbor’s subsurface, so long as he does not physically drill into
102
his neighbor’s land in an attempt to capture the resources.
103
Sourdough’s identified portion is situated on state land
104
leased to BP and Chevron. The oil that presently sits beneath the
state land can be legally developed, and, under the common law
rule of capture, any oil that might migrate from federal land would
belong to producers on state leases. According to the lease agreement with BP and Chevron, the State of Alaska will receive a roy105
alty payment of 12.5% from the produced oil. Therefore, based
on the lease agreement, Alaska’s royalties could derive not only
from oil beneath its own land, but also from oil that may have
originated in ANWR. Accordingly, Alaska would deprive the federal government of royalties it would have otherwise received if the
actual oil drilling had occurred in ANWR under federal lease
agreements. If the State uses directional drilling to tap into the oil
field on the ANWR side, this may be considered a subsurface trespass absent a valid federal lease for the corresponding ANWR surface area. However, in order to lease the land in ANWR, Congress
would have to lift the ban on oil production contained in section
1003 of ANILCA.

101. See TWYMAN, supra note 50, at CRS-7, CRS-9.
102. Colby, supra note 23, at 402.
103. “Identified portion” refers to the drilled, delineated oil reserve on the
state leases as opposed to the portion of the Sourdough reservoir that may or may
not lie on the ANWR side.
104. 100-Million-Bbl Oil Field, supra note 14, at 1.
105. See COMPETITIVE LEASE SALES, supra note 68. The Sourdough wells are
located on lease ADL-343112. See ALASKA OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N,
ALASKA WELLS WITH EXTENDED CONFIDENTIALITY (2002), at http://www.state.
ak.us/local/akpages/ADMIN/ogc/ci.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). Leases ADL343101 through ADL-343113 were part of lease sale number thirty-six. See
ALASKA DEP’T OF NATURAL RES. DIV. OF OIL & GAS, STATE OF ALASKA
COMPETITIVE OIL & GAS LEASE SALES (2001), at http://www.dog.dnr.state.
ak.us/oil/programs/leaseadmin/magic1.htm (“Although the state usually receives
cash from the oil and gas lessees for its royalty share, the state has the option of
taking its royalty in-kind and selling it itself [to someone other than the producer].”); Press Release, Alaska Dep’t of Natural Res., Solicitation for Offers to
Purchase Alaska North Slope Royalty Gas (Dec. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/programs/royalty/rik_sale/press_release_12_26_
01_patp.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
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B. Alaska’s Right to Drain Versus Congressional Intent to
Protect
In ANILCA, Congress explicitly stated that not only is oil
production from ANWR prohibited, but that “no leasing or other
development leading to production of oil and gas from [ANWR]
106
shall be undertaken until authorized by an Act of Congress.”
Arguably, Sourdough development encompasses drainage, and
hence production, from ANWR. Because of the potential for indirect production of oil and gas from ANWR, Congress’s intent in establishing the refuge becomes relevant.
Section 101 of ANILCA states that Congress intended the Act
to preserve and provide for scenic landscapes, wildlife habitat,
107
natural ecosystems, and wilderness recreational opportunities.
However, ANILCA was also designed to provide adequate opportunities “for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of
the State of Alaska and its people,” and Congress found the designation of public lands in ANILCA “to represent a proper balance
between the reservation of [federal land] and those public lands
necessary and appropriate for more intensive use and disposi108
tion.” In recognition of that purpose, Congress did not designate
109
all of ANWR wilderness. Section 1002 of ANILCA specifically
authorizes exploratory activity within the coastal plain and requires
the Secretary of the Interior to analyze impacts of oil and gas ex110
ploration, development, and production on wildlife resources.

106. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (2000) (emphasis added).
107. Id. § 3101(b).
It is the intent of Congress in this Act to preserve unrivaled scenic and
geological values associated with natural landscapes; to provide for the
maintenance of sound populations of, and habitat for, wildlife species of
inestimable value to the citizens of Alaska and the Nation, including
those species dependent on vast relatively undeveloped areas; to preserve in their natural state extensive unaltered arctic tundra, boreal forest, and coastal rainforest ecosystems; to protect the resources related to
subsistence needs; to protect and preserve historic and archeological
sites, rivers, and lands, and to preserve wilderness resource values and
related recreational opportunities including but not limited to hiking, canoeing, fishing, and sport hunting, within large arctic and subarctic wildlands and on freeflowing rivers; to maintain opportunities for scientific
research and undisturbed ecosystems.
Id.
108. Id. § 3101(d).
109. The fact that the coastal plain is not designated wilderness may preclude
designation as such, since a wilderness designation might conflict with the “nomore” clause contained in ANILCA. See id.
110. Id. § 3142.
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Senator Frank Murkowski, who favors opening ANWR,
lauded Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson’s foresight in including
the section 1002 study and reporting requirements, stating that
“[t]he reason the 1.5 million acres was set aside was to consider the
111
great oil potential in the area.” Senator Murkowski’s statement
coincides with Congress’s efforts in ANILCA to balance ecological
preservation and federal land reservations with reasonable use and
112
development in non-wilderness areas. Therefore, the wilderness
portion of ANWR should be contrasted with the coastal plain,
113
Had Congress
where Congress explicitly required exploration.
desired to ban development on the coastal plain, it would have expanded the wilderness portion instead of ordering a resources survey of the 1002 area.
The ban on coastal plain oil development contemplated in sec114
tion 1003 of ANILCA was intended to preserve the natural values of the surface estate, not the subterranean geology. Drainage is
a reasonable use in this context because it does not conflict with
115
Congress’s intent, as stated in section 101, to preserve wildlife
habitat and ecosystems. State lease development, and the ensuing
drainage, would have no effect on ANWR’s corresponding surface
estate. Therefore, Alaska’s right to produce oil from state leases is
left intact despite ANILCA’s ban on surface development of federal land.
C. Efficient Development Requires Unitized Oil Fields
At least one early legal scholar in oil development noted that
state legislatures and Congress could protect the collective producers’ and owners’ rights to produce oil and gas and to prevent
116
waste. Not surprisingly, both Congress and the State of Alaska
117
enacted statutes to prevent waste. Waste prevention statutes are
The purpose of this section is to provide for a comprehensive and continuing inventory and assessment of the fish and wildlife resources of the
coastal plain of [ANWR], an analysis of the impacts of oil and gas exploration, development, and production, and to authorize exploratory activity within the coastal plain in a manner that avoids significant adverse effects on the fish and wildlife and other resources.
Id. § 3142(a).
111. 141 CONG. REC. 14,238 (May 24, 1995) (statement by Sen. Murkowski).
112. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d).
113. Id. § 3142.
114. Id. § 3143.
115. Id. § 3101(b).
116. Colby, supra note 23, at 363 (discussing Justice White’s commentary in
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900)).
117. 30 U.S.C. § 226(m) (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.110 (Michie 2001).
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justified because the public as a whole has a sufficient interest in
the preservation of these resources.118 This legislation typically re119
120
quires parties to “unitize” the oil or gas field. Unit agreements
group the subsurface hydrocarbons, giving the leaseholders a percentage interest in the produced oil and gas based on the pre121
The
development amounts underlying their individual leases.
lease owners then operate the field as one unit, usually selecting
one leaseholder as the actual operator. Under unitization, parties
share operating expenses and profits based on their ownership per122
Unitization allows for
centage, as defined in the agreement.
more efficient development of oil and gas, therefore operating to
123
the benefit of both the lessors and the lessees. Unitization obviates the need for the rule of capture, and thus allows the operator
to flood one end of the oil field with water in order to push oil to
producing wells elsewhere. Absent unitization, individual leaseholders may attempt to flood fields, independently risking trespass
through subsurface water invasion.
118. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 204 (1900) (quoting Hague v.
Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719-20 (Pa. 1893)).
119. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.110.
120. A unit agreement is a plan for development and/or operation of an oil or
gas field that is developed as a single consolidated unit, without regard to the
varying ownerships of the overlying lands. Costs and benefits are allocated as defined in the plan. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL, supra note 10, at 1315.
121. Id. at 1317. More specifically,
[unitization is a] term frequently used interchangeably with [pooling,]
but more properly used to denominate the joint operation of all or some
portion of a producing reservoir as distinguished from pooling, which
term is used to describe the bringing together of small tracts sufficient for
the granting of a well permit under applicable spacing rules.
Pooling is important in the prevention of drilling unnecessary and uneconomic wells, which will result in physical and economic waste. Unitization is important where there is separate ownership of portions of the
rights in a common producing pool in order that it may be made economically feasible to engage in cycling, pressure maintenance or secondary recovery operations and to explore for minerals at considerable
depths.
The best results in conservation can be attained only by unitization.
Only in this way can appropriate use of reservoir pressures be made and
secondary recovery operations utilized at the appropriate early stage in
the exploration of the oil deposits.
Id. at 1317-18.
122. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
123. Froholm v. Cox, 934 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that although
unitization may be contrary to the personal wishes of a particular party, “unitization is for the purpose of more properly developing oil and gas; therefore, the
units would naturally operate to the benefit of both the lessee and lessor”).
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The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 contemplates unitization by
authorizing federal leaseholders to enter into cooperative agreements or unit plans whenever the Secretary of the Interior deems it
necessary or advisable to the public interest.124 Further, the Secretary has the discretion to modify lease agreements in furtherance of
125
the unit plan and may require unitization when a lease is issued.
In the Mineral Leasing Act, Congress explicitly stated that unitization is “[f]or the purpose of more properly conserving the natural
126
resources of any oil or gas pool, field, or like area . . . .”
Alaska’s unitization statute builds on the federal scheme and
further authorizes the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commis127
sion (AOGCC) to force parties into a unitization agreement if
128
they cannot reach one on their own. The stated mission of the
AOGCC, the body charged with regulating the underground operation of Alaska’s oil industry, is “to protect the public interest in
exploration and development of oil and gas resources, ensuring
129
conservation practices, and maxim[izing] ultimate recovery.”
Theoretically, this policy against waste could be superceded by ei130
ther state or federal law explicitly sanctioning waste. If oil reserves are proven to exist in the 1002 area, a law sanctioning waste
may be necessary to designate the area as wilderness.

124. 30 U.S.C. § 226(m) (2000); see also Norfolk Energy, Inc. v. Hodel, 898 F.2d
1435, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990).
125. 30 U.S.C. § 226(m).
126. Id. (announcing the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to establish,
alter, or modify cooperative or unit plans).
127. The Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission is an independent
quasi-judicial agency within the executive branch of the state. ALASKA OIL &
GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COMMISSION HISTORY (2001), at http://www.
state.ak.us/admin/ogc/history.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
128. Alaska law stipulates that the AOGCC, “upon proper petition, after notice and hearing, has jurisdiction, power and authority, and it is its duty to make
and enforce orders and do the things necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this section.” ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.110(a) (Michie 2001). The Supreme
Court of Alaska has formally recognized the Commission’s authority. See Allen v.
Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 1 P.3d 699, 701-02 (Alaska 2000).
129. ALASKA OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, MISSION (2001), at http://
www.state.ak.us/admin/ogc/homeogc.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); see also
ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.030 (Michie 2001).
130. See Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 517 P.2d 432, 435 (Okla. 1973). In a discussion of the earlier Supreme Court case Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S.
365 (1967), the court noted that a “lessee is obligated to prevent the waste of oil
and gas and agrees to pay the Indian lessor the full value of all gas wasted, unless
the Secretary determines at the request of the lessee that the waste was sanctioned
by state and federal law.” 517 P.2d at 435.
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D. Executive Authority, Drainage, and Reserves
1. Implied Executive Authority to Lease. The Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 gives the Secretary of the Interior the discretion to enter into lease agreements when “lands owned by the United States
131
are being drained of oil or gas by wells drilled on adjacent lands.”
If such drainage occurs, the Secretary “may negotiate agreements
whereby the United States . . . shall be compensated for such
132
The federal government traditionally dealt with oil
drainage.”
and gas drainage from its lands by holding a lease sale, thereby allowing the affected leaseholders to enter into a unitization agree133
However, when the federal government withdraws land
ment.
for a specific purpose, such as was the case for ANWR, the withdrawal is not subject to the leasing provisions of the Mineral Leas134
ing Act.
At least one court believes that a state has a sovereign right to
135
drain from beneath closed federal lands. If so, then it would follow that the federal government has a corresponding obligation to
lease its lands for mineral development if it suspects that its resources are being depleted. A 1941 opinion letter by U.S. Attorney
General Robert Jackson implies such a duty on the part of the federal government:
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to confirm the
view expressed by me at a recent cabinet meeting that there is
implied authority in the Executive branch to take protective
measures in cases where lands acquired by the United States for
a specific public purpose are found to contain oil which is being
drained by adjoining owners—such lands not being subject to
the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920.
It is my opinion that the authority to take the protective action is
vested in the department or agency charged with jurisdiction

131. 30 U.S.C. § 226(j) (2000).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 796 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(noting that the Secretary of the Interior solicited bids for a lease sale after discovering the potential for oil drainage from federal land); McKenna v. Udall, 418
F.2d 1171, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (involving a case where an agency held a lease
sale after determining that oil drainage existed from surplus Army land); KN Energy, Inc., v. Marathon Oil Co., No. CV82-L-564, 1983 WL 1430 at *16 (D. Neb.
1983) (involving a case in which the Bureau of Land Management accepted bids
for oil and gas leases when it appeared that production from nearby leases was
draining federal land).
134. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (2000).
135. Santa Fe Int’l Corp. v. Watt, 591 F. Supp. 929, 942 (D. Del. 1984).
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over the land involved, and includes the making of any necessary
136
contracts.

Jackson’s opinion begs the question: What did the Attorney General mean by the term “protective measures”? Considering the
need for oil created by World War II, it seems likely that “protective measures” meant the authority to undertake mineral leasing.
Seventeen years later, in Federal Land Bank of Houston v. United
137
States, the United States Court of Claims took a similar position,
stating that an obligation exists “on the part of the Government to
lease for drilling if the facts show that wells on the adjacent land
are producing oil and possibly depleting the oil in place and recov138
erable from the land in question.”
Even if the Attorney General’s opinion is rendered moot for
ANWR under section 1003 of ANILCA, the State of Alaska could
force the federal government into a lease sale pursuant to its
139
authority to force unitization, or under federal policy designed to
prevent waste. Alaska Senator Frank H. Murkowski recognized
that the federal government could be drawn into further consideration of ANWR regardless of congressional action, stating that
“there may come a point where the federal government will have a
responsibility to federal taxpayers to find out what resources lie
140
under parts of the Arctic coastal plain.” Some scholars also sug141
gest that lessees have a duty to seek unitization, which would
136. 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 41 (1941) (citations omitted).
137. 168 F. Supp. 788, 791 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
138. Id.
[The federal government] must work within the framework of the laws
and regulations as are designed to protect the public from executive
waste in dealing with the public domain. This does not mean that the
Government could stand idly by and permit the oil in place to be depleted. The Government must act as speedily as possible under the circumstances.
Id.
139. The State of Louisiana unsuccessfully brought a claim against the United
States on a correlative rights issue based on both Louisiana and federal law. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. United States, 832 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1987). However, the
claim was dismissed because the record showed no evidence of waste. Id. at 94344. Although the Fifth Circuit declined to recognize a duty on the part of the Secretary of the Interior to require unitization in all cases, the facts underlying that
case are distinguishable from those surrounding ANWR. The Louisiana case involved an offshore tract and did not involve any closed federal land. Id. at 938.
The merits of an Alaska-law based suit are beyond the scope of this Article.
140. Karey & Ragsdale, supra note 7, at 1 (quoting Sen. Frank Murkowski).
141. See George W. Hardy III, Drainage of Oil and Gas from Adjoining
Tracts—A Further Development, 6 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 45-51 (1966). In discussing Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App.
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necessarily require BP and Chevron to lobby Congress to allow
ANWR leasing. However, the extent of this duty in the case of
ANWR is questionable because ANWR is not available for leasing.
If external pressure forces the federal government into leasing,142 all pressures are conditioned on oil actually being in place in
ANWR and draining to adjacent state land. The issue then becomes how the Secretary of the Interior or the State of Alaska can
prove that oil would actually drain from ANWR. Alaska’s Oil and
Gas Conservation Commissioner, along with the House Committee
on Natural Resources, believe that a well must be drilled in order
143
Drilling a well requires an
to prove the presence of oil or gas.
Act of Congress to override the current ban on production included in ANILCA. However, BP, the operator of Sourdough, insists that the field is not intended for use as a “back-door approach
144
to getting into ANWR.”
2. Proving Drainage. The next issue is to determine exactly
what evidence is required to prove that oil is draining across a political boundary. Contrary to the Commissioner’s belief, drainage
may be proven without drilling a well. Most of the cases dealing
with proof of oil and gas drainage fall into two categories: (1) situations where a lessee avoids paying royalties due to a lessor by
draining oil from under the leased land via a well on an adjacent
property also controlled by the lessee but with terms more favorable to the lessee; and (2) situations involving neighboring landowners (or their lessees) that seek to drain each other’s tracts.
145
Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. is an example of
the first type of oil and gas drainage case. In Breaux, the plaintiff
leased land to the defendant, reserving the right to production roy146
alties. The defendant-lessee also owned a leasehold on an adja1964), Hardy states that there is a due diligence standard which would require
unitization under the implied covenant to protect the leased premises. Hardy, supra, at 45. The lessor might be able to recover damages if the lessee has improvidently failed to secure unitization of the part of the leased premises drained by a
nearby well. Id. at 46. This failure to unitize reasonably may be considered an
essential part of a claim. Id. at 50; see also HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J.
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 935 (1991) (discussing the duty of an operator to
unitize in the context of leasable or already leased lands) [hereinafter WILLIAMS &
MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW].
142. Such external pressure may include a lawsuit based on waste of a resource
or litigation seeking unitization or administrative leasing due to drainage.
143. See Mack, supra note 4, at 82; HOUSE COMM., supra note 9.
144. 100-Million-Bbl Oil Field, supra note 14, at 3.
145. 163 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
146. Id. at 408.
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cent tract of land.147 The defendant drilled a well on the adjacent
land approximately 80 feet from plaintiff’s property and extracted
considerable amounts of oil.148 The plaintiff argued that since oil
had drained from his land, he was entitled to damages based on the
149
production that could have occurred on his land. The action in
Breaux was premised on the idea that the defendant-lessee
breached an implied covenant to prevent drainage from the lessor’s
150
The court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition on
land.
grounds of insufficiency because the plaintiffs had failed to allege
or prove that the lessee could have successfully produced oil or gas
from an offset well, that the drilling of such a well would have been
prudent or economically feasible, or that any oil or gas would have
151
been produced from such a well.
The second category of drainage cases usually involves two
152
lessees and two lessors. In Renner v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
153
plaintiff Renner, as lessor, sued his lessee.
Defendant-lessee
Monsanto had completed a well and was producing oil from Ren154
Baldwin owned an adjacent tract to the south,
ner’s property.
155
Sinclair
which he had leased to Sinclair Oil & Gas Company.
drilled an offset well to prevent the oil underneath the Baldwin
156
Sinclair then drilled a
land from draining to the Renner land.
second well, closer to the Renner property line but further to the
157
west. Renner claimed that the second Sinclair well was draining
oil from Renner’s land, and therefore Monsanto, as Renner’s les147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. For a comprehensive discussion on implied covenants to protect from
drainage, see WILLIAMS & MYERS OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 141, §§ 821-26.
151. Breaux, 163 So. 2d at 417-18.
152. 354 P.2d 326, 329 (Kan. 1960).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. “[An offset well is a] well drilled on one tract of land to prevent the
drainage of oil or gas to an adjoining tract of land, on which a well is being drilled
or is already in production.” WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL, supra note 10, at
807.
[An offset well covenant is a] contractual duty, either expressed or implied in an oil and gas lease, to use due diligence to protect the leasehold
from drainage. Also called the protection covenant and the drainage
covenant. Where the duty is an implied one, the lessee must drill an offset well on the lease if substantial drainage is taking place and if an ordinary prudent operator would do so under similar circumstances.
Id. at 808.
157. Renner, 354 P.2d at 329-30.
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see, had a duty to drill an offset well to prevent the drainage.158 The
Renner court concluded that drainage was occurring in a substantial amount and that an ordinary, prudent operator would have
drilled a well within a reasonable time after the operator on the
159
adjoining land had done so. While neither Breaux nor Renner is
specifically applicable to the circumstances of closed federal land,
the evidence used to prove drainage is a useful tool in analyzing
how drainage from ANWR might be proved.
In order to prove drainage from ANWR, the federal government must first show through maps, records, or even ordinary witnesses (1) the proximity of the well causing drainage and (2) that
160
the well produces a large amount of oil or gas. However, even if
161
the federal government establishes a required spacing order that
theoretically places the well’s drainage area within ANWR, the
government must further show substantial drainage, which neces-

158. Id. at 331. For a more thorough discussion of traditional drainage rights
and duties, see WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 141, §§ 82126.
159. Renner, 354 P.2d at 335.
160. WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 141, § 823.1. To illustrate that a test well is unnecessary, Williams and Meyers posit the following
hypothetical:
Plaintiff alleges that a certain well, 150 feet north of his boundary line, is
draining him and should be offset. He proves by an ordinary witness, or
by maps and records, the location of this well, that it is 150 feet from the
plaintiff’s land, and that it produces a large amount of oil. Plaintiff has
gone part way to establishing the ultimate fact of substantial drainage.
He may be able to take a further step without expert assistance by
showing that a spacing order of the regulatory commission determines
that wells in the field drain a radial area greater than 150 feet. Whether
plaintiff can thus avoid reliance on an expert depends upon the admissibility and weight of the commission order for this purpose. The plaintiff
still has not proved substantial drainage, however, since he has not
shown that there is a mineral under his land to be drained. Almost always this will be a matter of expert opinion, although there may be cases
where this fact can be proved by prior admissions of the party opponent
or by a well belatedly drilled upon the leasehold.
Id. (citations omitted).
161. Well spacing is further defined as follows:
The regulation of the number and location of wells over an oil or gas reservoir, as a conservation measure.
It is generally agreed today that increased recovery from a reservoir is
not a function of the number of wells drilled. Thus to the extent that
more wells are drilled than are necessary for maximum recovery, there is
economic waste, since the cost of drilling the unnecessary wells need not
have been incurred.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL, supra note 10, at 1359.
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sarily includes proving the presence of oil or gas.162 Almost always,
this will require expert testimony, unless it can be proved by a prior
admission of the party opponent, or by actually drilling a well.163
A second evidentiary issue arises when the court must decide
whether to admit expert testimony concerning reservoir conditions
based on data prepared by others, or even whether to admit the
164
underlying data itself. In the Sourdough context, the federal government gathered and prepared the seismic data on the ANWR
165
side, so it is likely that the court could call an expert who prepared and analyzed the data.
The court may not, however, determine the sufficiency of the
seismic data as a matter of law. Traditionally, courts have left the
determination of the substantiality of seismic data to the appropriate state commission. In Moncrief v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conser166
vation Commission, the court stated:
Our function is to examine the conflicting evidence to determine
whether the commission reasonably based its findings and decision upon all the evidence which was before it. Technical decisions relative to the waste of oil and gas resources, however, are
for the commission, as the trier of fact made up of experts in the
167
field, to make and not for this Court to decide.
168

In Vogel v. Corporation Commission, the plaintiffs appealed
the decision of a spacing order because they believed that it was
169
based upon wholly questionable seismic information. While the
Vogel court acknowledged the lack of authority holding that seismic data is insufficient by itself, the court noted that since the case
included physical wells, there was no need to reach the issue of the
170
Eugene Kuntz, a prominent oil
sufficiency of the seismic data.
and gas scholar, has cited Vogel for the proposition that there is no
fixed standard of substantial evidence to determine the existence of
162. WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 141, § 823.1.
163. Id.
164. Id. § 823.2. The power of eminent domain could also require BP and
Chevron to produce to the government the data that they possess from the nearby
well. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
165. See UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 78, at 1.
166. 981 P.2d 913 (Wyo. 1999) (reviewing Commission’s decision regarding
spacing order based on seismic data).
167. Id. at 915-16.
168. 399 P.2d 474 (Okla. 1965).
169. Id. at 475.
170. Id. at 476; see also Hester v. Sinclair Oil and Gas Co., 351 P.2d 751, 754-55
(Okla. 1960) (discussing the evidentiary standard for a spacing order); Harkin
Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1183 (Utah
1996) (holding that the board applied the correct standard of proof).
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an oil or gas deposit.171 However, Kuntz also cites Vogel for the
proposition that interpretation of seismic data and geologic conditions is itself sufficient evidence to establish a spacing unit, thereby
negating the need to drill a well to locate a common reservoir.172
Kuntz further notes that “statutes relating to field-wide unitization
require that the unit area shall include only so much of a common
source of supply that has been defined and determined to be pro173
Applying
ductive of oil and gas by actual drilling operations.”
this last principle, the Sourdough unit cannot include ANWR until
wells are drilled. Still, the courts are reluctant to specify a standard
174
to determine whether oil and gas evidence is substantial, preferring to leave the determination up to the appropriate state oil and
gas agency.
3. Proving Reserves. To establish drainage, a party must
175
prove oil exists to be drained. The only way to know with cer176
Federal
tainty that a field contains oil or gas is to drill a well.
regulations define “proved reservoirs,” in the context of financial
accounting and reporting for oil and gas producing activities, as
follows:
(i)

Reservoirs are considered proved if economic producibility
is supported by either actual production or a conclusive
formation test. The area of a reservoir considered proved
includes (A) that portion delineated by drilling and defined
by gas-oil and/or oil-water contacts, if any, and (B) the immediately adjoining portions not yet drilled, but which can
be reasonably judged as economically productive on the basis of available geological and engineering data. In the absence of information on fluid contacts, the lowest known

171. Eugene Kuntz, Recent Natural Resources Cases, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 213,
213 (1965) (“[T]he court has not been inclined to recognize specific standards to
be applied in determining whether or not the evidence in a given case is substantial.”).
172. Id. at 213-14 (“From the standpoint of its practical impact, the Vogel case
does much to encourage the practice of establishing drilling units on the sole basis
of seismic data.”); see also Joseph R. Dancy & Victoria A. Dancy, The Regulation
of the Oil and Gas Industry by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 21 TULSA
L.J. 613, 633 (1986).
173. Kuntz, supra note 171, at 215 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4
(Supp. 1964)).
174. See id. at 213.
175. For a technical discussion on how reservoir sizes are estimated, see COSSÉ,
supra note 29, at 211-59.
176. HYNE, supra note 2, at 5.
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structural occurrence of hydrocarbons controls the lower
177
proved limit of the reservoir . . . .
(iii) Estimates of proved reserves do not include the following: . . . (B) crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids,
the recovery of which is in doubt because of uncertainty as
to geology, reservoir characteristics, or economic factors;
(C) crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids that may
178
occur in undrilled prospects . . . .

Subsection (i)(A) applies to the known Sourdough reservoir be179
cause wells drilled in Sourdough establish oil contacts. These exploration wells may even be commercially viable, but they have
180
been granted extended confidentiality by the State, meaning the
actual well data is not yet available to the public, and thus the
commercial viability of the wells is uncertain. If expert interpretation of geological and engineering data establishes that the underground formation containing the known Sourdough deposits extends into ANWR, then subsection (i)(B) will apply as an adjoining
portion not yet drilled. Accordingly, ANWR would not require an
exploratory well so long as sufficient seismic data exists to establish
ANWR’s economic productivity. However, the estimates of
proved reserves in subsection (iii) do not include reserves whose
181
The
recovery is uncertain because of geological characteristics.
government may not be able to overcome the limits of subsection
(iii) absent more specific seismic data from the coastal plain. Further, a court hearing a case on whether ANWR contains proved reserves may deny the introduction of seismic evidence altogether if
ANWR is considered an undrilled prospect.
Productivity thus
hinges on expert testimony related to geological and engineering
data, specifically, whether the limited existing data sufficiently
proves that the Sourdough accumulation extends into ANWR.
Absent sufficient data, test wells would be necessary—but such
182
drilling is prohibited by ANILCA’s section 1003 ban. If Congress
refuses to lift the ban, the question returns to whether the federal
government should be allowed to sanction the drainage, ultimately
denying federal royalties to the American people and directly conflicting with the public policy against wasting oil and gas.
177.
178.
179.
180.

17 C.F.R. § 210.4-10(a)(2)(i) (2002).
Id. § 210.4-10(a)(2)(iii).
See id. § 210.4-10(a)(2)(i)(A).
For a list of wells with extended confidentiality, see ALASKA OIL & GAS
CONSERVATION COMM’N, ALASKA WELLS WITH EXTENDED CONFIDENTIALITY
(2001), at http://www.state.ak.us/local/akpages/ADMIN/ogc/ci.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2002).
181. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-10(a)(2)(iii).
182. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (2000).
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While at least one case does use the regulatory definition of
proved reserves, it does so in the context of contract law as opposed to determining the existence of a reservoir.183 Other courts
have taken a slightly different approach to the definition of
184
“proved reserves.” In F.T.C. v. Texaco, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia used the definition put forward
185
by the American Gas Association (AGA):
Proved Reserves are the estimated quantity of natural gas which
analysis of geologic and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be recoverable in the future from known oil
and gas reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions. Reservoirs are considered proved that have demonstrated
the ability to produce by either an actual production or conclusive formation test.
The area of a reservoir considered proved is that portion delineated by drilling and defined by gas-oil, gas-water contacts or
limited by the structural deformation or lenticularity of the reservoir. In the absence of fluid contacts, the lowest known structural occurrency of hydrocarbons controls the proved limits of
the reservoir. The proved area of a reservoir may also include
the adjoining portions not delineated by drilling but which can
be evaluated as economically productive on the basis of geological and engineering data available at the time the estimate is
made. Therefore, the reserves reported should include total
proved reserves which may be in either the drilled or the un186
drilled portions of the field or reservoir.

183. Gregg v. Am. Quasar Petroleum Co., 840 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D. Colo.
1991) (holding that proved reserves, for purposes of employee bonus determination, are properly excluded non-economically recoverable components).
184. 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
185. Id. at 866 (“The American Gas Association (AGA), [is] a trade association composed of producers, distributors, and marketers of natural gas, [and] is
recognized as one of the principal sources of authoritative statistical data concerning the natural gas industry.”).
186. Id. at 866, 867 n.2. The court also noted that
[e]ssentially the concept of proved reserves is bottomed on the presence
of enough technical data to ensure reasonably accurate measurement of
a known reservoir. Even proved reserves are only estimates, however,
and competent evaluators may produce slightly different figures based
on different analyses of the geological data. Gas producers may also denominate reserves as “speculative,” “possible,” “probable,” “recoverable,” or “ultimately recoverable” indicating the progression of knowledge as a field is developed but there is no accepted use or definition of
these terms by the industry. Only proved reserves are consistently defined, and only proved reserves are reported by the AGA.
Id. at 867 n.2 (citations omitted).
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This definition is very similar to the regulatory definition used
in Gregg v. American Quasar Petroleum Co.187 However, the AGA
definition centers on whether the reserves can be produced with
reasonable certainty under existing economic and operating condi188
tions. Current estimates of any Sourdough reserves existing on
the ANWR side cannot be included in this definition of “proved
reserves”; the existing economic and operating conditions required
under the definition are not present because ANILCA’s ban on
exploration precludes production or even conclusive formation
tests. While the remaining portions of the AGA definition are
nearly identical to the regulatory definition, the AGA test sets a
heightened burden to establish a “proved” reserve. Under this
more stringent definition, obtaining conclusive well data requires
Congress to lift ANILCA’s ban on oil exploration.
Other courts have taken different approaches in determining
what constitutes a proved reserve. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
189
County of Lane, the court noted that geothermal interests are
190
very similar to oil and gas interests in that they both concern subsurface minerals valued for their energy-producing capabilities and
191
The Phillips
both employ mining techniques for development.
case involved a tax assessment against the plaintiff’s “geothermal
192
The court in Phillips held that the plaintiff overinterests.”
whelmingly proved reserves with evidence consisting of an agreement that included an interest in “proven geothermal steam reserves,” along with the fact that there were seventeen completed
193
194
production wells in place. In Vestal v. United States, the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas noted that six
successful, but not currently producing, gas wells consisting of

187. Gregg, 840 F. Supp. at 1398.
188. Texaco, 555 F.2d at 867 n.2.
189. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
190. Id. at 771.
191. Id. (“Each of these resources takes a very long time to form. Each is finite
and depletable. None is produced in a ‘pure’ form, each being produced along
with many of the same associated minerals.” (quoting Pariani v. State, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 683, 691 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).
192. Id. at 766 (“Aminoil and Phillips filed five successive complaints against
the County of Lake . . . seeking partial recovery of property taxes assessed against
their ‘geothermal interests’ during the tax years 1978-1984.”).
193. Id. at 772, 773 n.11.
194. Nos. CIV.A. ED 71 C-17 & ED 72 C-5, 1973 WL 506, at *1 (W.D. Ark.
Feb. 9, 1973).
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“Sour Gas,” heavy in sulfur derivates, constituted “proven” reserves for commercial production purposes.195
Phillips and Vestal illustrate that evidence concerning a well is
not required to prove drainage if non-well evidence is substantial—
substantiality being determined by the appropriate agency. How196
ever, well data is generally required to prove reserves. Currently,
no reserves are proven in ANWR. Therefore, if existing data does
not show substantial evidence of drainage into Alaskan lands, the
federal government will need to use a well to establish that drainable reserves exist in ANWR. Of course, proving that oil exists in
ANWR via either method does not answer the underlying question: Why should ANWR be developed?
IV. THE CASE FOR DEVELOPING ANWR
In 1970, the United States produced 9.6 million barrels of oil
197
per day. That figure had fallen to 7.1 million barrels per day by
198
1992 and to 5.8 million barrels per day by 2000. Between 1992
and 2000, imports of crude oil increased from 6 million barrels per
199
day to 8.9 million barrels per day. By 2020, domestic production
without ANWR is projected to decrease from its current daily rate
of 5.8 million barrels to 5.6 million barrels while daily consumption
is projected to rise from 19.7 million barrels to 26.7 million bar200
Only through increases in crude imports has the United
rels.
States offset increased petroleum consumption and declining do201
According to the Bush Administration, this
mestic production.
constitutes a growing hazard to the energy security of the United
States, which underscores the need to explore ANWR for oil and
202
gas.

195. Id. at *2.
196. Phillips, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771-72.
197. The Facts About the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) Coastal
Plain, ANWR STATUS REPORT (Arctic Power, Anchorage, AK), Spring 2001, at 2
(“Domestic oil production fell to 5.6 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2000 from a
high of 9.6 million bpd in 1970.”) [hereinafter ANWR STATUS REPORT].
198. Peter Behr & Eric Pianin, With Energy Woes, Differing Solutions, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 2001, at A3.
199. Id.
200. M. LYNNE CORN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ARCTIC NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (June 11, 2002), at CRS-5.
201. ROBERT L. BAMBERGER, CRS ISSUE BRIEF, ENERGY POLICY: SETTING
THE STAGE FOR THE CURRENT DEBATE (July 10, 2002), at CRS-8.
202. Behr & Pianin, supra note 198, at A3.
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Opponents of exploration in ANWR believe that conservation
and alternative energy development can make up this difference,203
but even an increase in corporate average fuel economy (CAFE)
standards on new vehicles will not introduce a meaningful fuel
savings for more than a decade—the time necessary for these vehicles to be introduced and take foothold in the market.204 Oil and
gas account for 65% of total U.S. energy consumption, and petro205
Currently,
leum demand is expected to increase 33% by 2020.
63% of the petroleum used in the United States is consumed by the
nation’s transportation infrastructure, which is 98% dependent on
206
oil. “[A]bsent some presently illusive technical ‘fix,’ there is little
that can be done to significantly reduce [U.S. dependence upon
imported oil] without incurring great economic hardship and life207
Realistically, weaning America’s dependstyle compromises.”
ence on oil will take longer than most ANWR drilling opponents
would like to believe.
Development of ANWR is not a quick technical fix, but rather
a long-term policy initiative to increase domestic production while
research continues on viable alternative energy sources. If Congress opened the coastal plain today, actual oil production would
take seven to ten years and the supply would likely last longer than

203. Press Release, The Wilderness Society, America Should Reject Big Oil’s
Tired Old Tune, Permanently Protect The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and
Adopt A Sustainable Energy Policy (Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.
wildernesssociety.org/newsroom/arctic_oil_092800.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002);
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Jobs and the Arctic, ENVTL. UPDATE (Sierra Club,
San Francisco, CA), 2002, at http://www.sierraclub.org/wildlands/arctic/jobs.asp
(last visited Oct. 22, 2002); Chris Baltimore, Oil Firms Don’t Need Alaska Refuge
to Drill - Democrats, REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2002, available at http://www.
planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/15528 (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). Contra
Making the Case for ANWR Development, FEATURE (Arctic Power, Anchorage,
AK), Feb. 2002, available at http://www.anwr.org/case.htm (last visited Oct. 22,
2002) [hereinafter Making the Case].
Eighty-eight percent of the energy for America’s transportation, industry, government and residential needs comes from oil, gas and coal. No
combination of conservation, technology or alternatives can come close
to replacing those fossil fuels. It will take years for research, testing,
permitting, construction, and distribution systems for replacement alternatives to be realized.
Id.
204. BAMBERGER, supra note 201, at CRS-8.
205. ANWR STATUS REPORT, supra note 197, at 2.
206. Id. at 3.
207. CORN, supra note 200, at CRS-8.
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twenty-five years.208 Potential ANWR oil production would mean
twenty-five years of fewer imports and as many as 12 billion barrels
of oil.209 The domestic oil supply in ANWR will allow for continued development of other energy sources without introducing an
economic burden that Americans are unwilling to accept and without further sacrificing national energy security.
Despite the benefits of developing ANWR, many Americans
are unwilling to accept the potential environmental burden associ210
ated with development. This perceived burden is largely due to a
lack of understanding of environmental stewardship practices occurring on the existing North Slope oil fields and the continuing
development of ecologically sensitive oil exploration technology.
The trend on the North Slope is toward compact developments, reduction of roads, centralized facilities, reduction of waste, and concentration of exploration during the winter when roads and explo211
Proponents argue that
ration pads can be built from ice.
ANWR’s 1.5 million acre coastal plain can be developed from a
212
Congress has taken that argument seri2,000 acre “footprint.”
ously; the House version of the energy bill introduced during the
th
107 Congress includes an explicit 2,000-acre limitation on surface
impacts (including any gravel berms, piers, or even airstrips) in
213
ANWR. ANWR’s development would impact 0.13% of the 1.5
214
million acre area. That figure clearly illustrates technological advances that have occurred in the last thirty years since Prudhoe
Bay’s development, which covers approximately 2.62% of its surface area and is still considered to be the cleanest oil development

208. Myths of ANWR, ANWR INFO. BRIEF (Arctic Power, Anchorage, AK),
Feb. 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Myths of ANWR].
209. Id. (“[ANWR oil] can be produced at a maximum rate of 2 million barrels
per day (capacity of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline). Therefore, it could last for 25
years, and probably much longer.”).
210. Mark Gillespie, Americans Favor Alternative Energy Methods to Solve
Shortages, SAN DIEGO EARTH TIMES ONLINE, (Dec. 2001), at http://www.
sdearthtimes.com/et1201/et1201s7.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); Will Lester,
Poll: Most Oppose ANWR Drilling, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 2, 2001,
available at http://152.52.16.166/nation/pstory/0,2974,235504,00.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2002);
211. CORN, supra note 200, at CRS-6.
212. Id.
213. Securing America’s Future Energy Act of 2001, H.R. 4, 107th Cong., §
6507(a)(3) (2001).
214. ANWR STATUS REPORT, supra note 197, at 7 (“Development in the 1002
Area would potentially alter about 2,000 of the area’s 1.5 million acres. That is
less than a quarter of one percent of the 1002 area.”).
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in the world.215 Most opponents also ignore the fact that half of a
million acres of the coastal plain between the section 1002 area and
Canada’s three-million-acre Northern Yukon National Park are already designated as wilderness.216 This half-million-acre arctic
coastal plain wilderness area is almost as large as the State of
217
Rhode Island.
The section 1002 coastal plain has been described as the “biological heart of the Arctic” and characterized as the only location
218
north of the Brooks Range supporting wildlife. This is far from
the truth. While the section 1002 area is certainly an important
ecological location, the coastal plain is nearly uniform in its ecological diversity all the way along the U.S. and Canadian arctic
219
coast. Because of this, impacts of oil development in the Prudhoe
Bay region, particularly impacts to the caribou herds, make an ex220
cellent analogy to potential development in ANWR.
The population of the Central Arctic caribou herd (CAH),
which spends its summers in and around the Prudhoe Bay area,
221
grew from 5,000 to 23,444 between 1975 and 1992. Matthew Cronin, a caribou biologist, estimated that the herd then decreased be222
tween 1992 and 1995, but as of 2000 the herd’s population was up
223
to 27,128. Cronin noted that

215. Id. at 12; Making the Case, supra note 203.
216. ANWR STATUS REPORT, supra note 197, at 12.
217. State of Rhode Island, Rhode Island Fun Facts (2002), at http://www.
state.ri.us/kids_page/fun_facts/ri_fun_facts.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). Rhode
Island covers 1,214 square miles, id., which equals 776,960 acres.
218. ANWR STATUS REPORT, supra note 197, at 8.
219. Id. (“The coastal plain of ANWR is home to caribou, grizzly bears, polar
bears, muskoxen, arctic foxes, shorebirds, eagles, and more. So are the existing
North Slope oil fields around Prudhoe Bay.”).
220. A full analysis comparing potential impacts in ANWR to present impacts
in Prudhoe Bay is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a case study of caribou provides a good example of potential impacts.
221. Matthew A. Cronin et al., Northern Alaska Oil Fields and Caribou, 28
WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 919, 920 (2000).
222. Id. (“Cronin . . . suggested that the decline in the western range between
1992 and 1995 was probably the result of population processes (i.e. population
density effects or immigration or emigration between the eastern and western
ranges) and was not related to oil fields. A census conducted in 1997 supported
this view.” (citing Cronin et al., Caribou Population Density in the Prudhoe Bay
Region of Alaska, 2 J. WILDLIFE RES. 59, 68 (1997))).
223. Do the Caribou Really Care? ANWR INFO. BRIEF (Arctic Power, Anchorage, AK), Feb. 2001 (showing a graph of Caribou herd population changes from
1975 through 2000).
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[t]his rate of growth is comparable to other caribou herds in undeveloped areas. In addition, survey data for 1990-1995 show
regular use of habitats in the oil fields and no avoidance of infrastructure. After the calving period in early June, caribou
move regularly throughout the oil fields and use gravel pads,
roads, and shade provided
by building and pipelines for relief
224
from parasitic insects.

That is not to say that development has had no impact on the
caribou. Cronin stated that some caribou have been displaced by
oil-field infrastructure during the calving season, but “these local
level impacts have not resulted in negative population-level effects
and the CAH has grown throughout the period of oil-field development at a rate comparable to other herds in undeveloped ar225
eas.” Cronin concluded that “[p]arturition and recruitment data
do not support the hypothesis that oil fields adversely affect cari226
bou productivity.”
Much concern has focused on the plight of the Porcupine caribou herd, which calves in the section 1002 area. However, studies
by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game from 1982 to 2000
show that in no single year did the entire herd calve in the pro227
tected section 1002 area. During that nineteen-year period, the
percentage calving in the 1002 area was less than 34% on nine oc228
cassions and only exceeded 66% on four occasions. In 1982 and
229
The percentage
2000, there were no calves born there at all.
calving reached a high of 92% in 1995, but by 2000 it had fallen to
230
zero percent. Caribou tend to choose their calving based on snow
231
melt and early growth of forage plants. Further, the Porcupine
caribou herd is down to 129,000 animals compared to its most re232
cent high of 180,000 in 1989. Caribou populations on the North

224. Cronin et al., supra note 221, at 920 (citations omitted).
225. Id. at 921 (citations omitted).
226. Id. (citations omitted).
227. Arctic Power, Draft-Porcupine Caribou Herd (PCH) 1982-2000 Percentage
of Cows Calving in the 1002 Area (Sept. 11, 2000) (citing ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH &
GAME, ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH & GAME PORCUPINE CARIBOU HERD CALVING
SURVEY REPORTS (July 31, 1995, Sept. 15, 1999, July 12, 2000)) (on file with
author).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. ANWR STATUS REPORT, supra note 197, at 10.
232. Id.
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Slope continue to naturally fluctuate today just as they have for
thousands of years.233
Opponents also bring up the physical impacts of drilling in ad234
dition to the potential biological impacts and question whether
adequate safeguards would be enforced to prevent and clean up
235
However, these critics ignore the fact
possible leaks and spills.
that Congress and regulatory agencies have the ability to include
236
rehabilitation requirements similar to those imposed by the State
237
of Alaska on the Prudhoe Bay fields. Oil producers would be required to develop plans to rehabilitate their impacts and all plans
would have to be assessed and approved by state and federal agen238
Even in Prudhoe Bay, most spills are quite small, from a
cies.
239
pint to ten gallons, and all spills are cleaned up, regardless of size.
In addition, most spills are contained on the gravel pads; those that
are not contained generally contact only snow and ice because the
North Slope operations area is covered in snow for most of the
240
year, making removal easy. Further, a trust fund could be established requiring that a percentage of revenues be set aside specifically for rehabilitation purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
Several policy considerations weigh in favor of opening
ANWR for oil production. The impacts of drilling would likely be
spread across the section 1002 area, but these impacts would be
minimized by the industry, and rehabilitation would be required.
Federal, state, and local regulations would be in place, and agencies
would monitor progress and enforce compliance. Development of

233. Id. (“There are more than 1 million caribou in Alaska divided into about
32 different herds or populations . . . . Caribou populations are known to vary
dramatically over time. They often show a boom-and-bust cycle, due to predation,
weather, overhunting, and other factors . . . . Populations continue to fluctuate as
they have for thousands of years.”).
234. CORN, supra note 200, at CRS-6 (“[T]here also would be impacts on the
physical environment and resources of the area – land, air, and water – as a result
of construction, operations, and human habitation.”).
235. Id. (“Critics, however, are concerned about environmental effects of routine operations in the fragile 1002 environment, as well as the possibility of leaks
and spills of various contaminating substances . . . .”).
236. Id. at CRS-8.
237. BP EXPLORATION & PHILLIPS ALASKA, ARCTIC ENERGY 38 (Aug. 2001)
[hereinafter ARCTIC ENERGY].
238. ANWR STATUS REPORT, supra note 197, at 7.
239. ARCTIC ENERGY, supra note 237, at 38.
240. Id.
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ANWR can assist in realistically moving the United States away
from dependence on foreign oil, and can do so with a larger benefit
to the world’s environment. It will take time before the United
States is able to change its transportation and energy infrastructure, time during which oil will be imported from other countries.
Do Americans want to get their oil from Russia, where for every
barrel of oil pulled out of the ground, two or three are spilled; or
from Columbia, where a native culture is being destroyed and
workers’ lives are risked because of guerrilla warfare; or from the
Middle East, where oil revenues indirectly support terrorism; or
from ANWR, where the American people, through elected officials, regulations, and direct voices, have a say in making sure that
an oil field is developed in an environmentally sensitive way?
ANWR needs to be developed, but too many politicians are
afraid of the issue because of ANWR’s political sensitivity and
Americans’ general lack of environmental understanding about the
North Slope. In the absence of congressional action opening
ANWR for drilling, there are four avenues of resolution to the potential problem of Sourdough development draining oil from an
undeveloped ANWR: (1) the Secretary of the Interior can lease
ANWR through his implied executive authority; (2) the State of
Alaska can take action against the United States to force field
241
unitization, placing the burden to prove drainage on the State; (3)
the State of Alaska can bring suit against the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment to avoid future liability to the federal
242
government for royalties on the drained oil; or (4) the United
States can take action to receive royalties, placing the burden of
proving drainage on the federal government.
If either the State of Alaska or the federal government wishes
to stake an affirmative claim to the oil located under ANWR, they
will be required to prove drainage. To prove drainage, an expert
must show that oil exists on the state land, and that based on the
geology, that same pool of oil is economically productive on the
ANWR side. If the data is sufficient, the analysis ends. Should
ANWR be considered an undrilled prospect, then the existing data
is presumptively unacceptable, requiring well data as conclusive
proof of reserves. Under the more widely accepted AGA definition of “proved reserve,” an expert attempt to show oil or gas re241. This also raises a constitutional question, under the Supremacy Clause, as
to the validity of Alaska’s claim against the federal government based in part on
its own state statute, as well as other states’ rights issues. However, these constitutional questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
242. Telephone Interview with John Norman, Shareholder, Hartig Rhodes
Hoge & Lekish (Aug. 20, 2002).
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coverability presumptively fails, since the AGA definition must
consider existing operating conditions, which preclude development in ANWR.
The State of Alaska cannot afford not to proceed with Sourdough’s development if it hopes to open the door to exploring
ANWR’s coastal plain. Sourdough is the key to this door. Even if
the United States allows royalties to slip away to the State of
Alaska once Sourdough production begins, Alaska’s causes of action do not become moot. If Sourdough is developed, Alaska wins.

